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ORGAN TRANSPLANTS FOR PRISONERS:
THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF INCARCERATION AND HEALTH CARE
___________________________________

I.

INTRODUCTION
Death row. In 1996, Horacio Alberto Reyes-Camerena was sentenced to death for the murder of

an 18-year-old woman whom he stabbed to death.1 A lengthy Oregon State appeals process for death row
inmates has kept him alive to date.2 His kidneys are failing as he awaits his execution.3 In 2003, a prison
physician concluded that Camerena was a good candidate for a kidney transplant due to his end-stage
kidney failure.4 The State of Oregon denied his request.5
Life-in-Prison. In 1967, James Earl Ray was sentenced to 99 years in a Tennessee state prison for
the assassination of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.6 While incarcerated, Ray was attacked and repeatedly
stabbed 22 times by a fellow inmate.7 He developed cirrhosis of the liver as a result of a blood
1

DAVID L. HUDSON, PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 60 (Allan Marzilli, ed., 2007).
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transfusion following the attack.8 Prison physicians concluded that Ray needed a liver transplant and was
subsequently placed on the organ waiting list.9 The State of Tennessee requires postoperative care to be
financed by the prisoner-patient.10 Ray was unable to raise the requisite funds to finance the transplant
operation.11 He died of liver failure.12
14-Years-in-Prison. In 2002, an unknown California inmate who was serving a 14-year sentence
for an armed robbery conviction, was given a heart transplant due to a viral illness contracted prior to his
incarceration.13 The transplant cost the State of California $1 million.14 The inmate was still serving his
sentence while undergoing postoperative care.15 The inmate died less than a year after his transplant.16
His death was attributed to the inmate being “less than a model patient.”17
The Eighth Amendment requires the government to provide prisoners with adequate medical
care.18 Medical services offered to prisoners range from routine medical visits and checkups to resource
intensive specialty care for chronic and terminal illnesses. Specialty care includes the treatment of
infectious diseases, chronic illnesses, mental health care, end-of-life care, and also organ failure.
Unfortunately, the examples above highlight the multitude of barriers prisoners often experience when
requiring medically necessary organ transplants. In each of these cases, the treating physician’s
recommendation for organ transplantation was rendered independent of the severity of the crime or the

8

Autopsy Confirms Ray Died of Liver Failure, CNN, April 24, 1998,
http://www.cnn.com/US/9804/24/ray.autopsy.pm/ [hereinafter CNN Ray].
9
Wright, supra note 6, at 1251.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
CNN Ray, supra note 8.
13
Prisoner Gets $1M Heart Transplant, CBSNEWS.COM (January 31, 2002),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/prisoner-gets-1m-heart-transplant/.
14
Id.
15
Kate Douglas, Comment, Prison Inmates Are Constitutionally Entitled to Organ Transplants-So Now What?, 49
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539-40 (2005).
16
Id. at 540.
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Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the
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length of sentence. And in each of these cases, despite the medical advice of the treating physician, the
prisoner-patient was denied an organ or given inadequate postoperative care post-surgery.
Supreme Court jurisprudence applying the Eighth Amendment to questions of medical care states
that prison officials are to give great deference to the treating physician’s recommendation.19 However,
medical judgment has been far from controlling when determining the scope of medical care provided a
prisoner with a serious medical need. Public opposition, resource allocation, and costs, all contribute to a
prison health care system not providing the same level of care to non-incarcerated individuals. As a result,
a treating physician’s medical judgment, professional medical ethics, and the law have been routinely
circumvented and many prisoners are left to suffer and/or die while incarcerated.
Organ transplants for prisoners largely depend on society’s commitments to prisoners’ health and
health care.20 Prisoners should have equal access to organs for transplantation because humanity and
justice demand compassion.21 Anything to the contrary offends the principle that all people have the right
to be treated with humanity and respect for their inherent dignity. The Eighth Amendment demands that
policies be developed to ensure prisoners are protected from extraneous factors impeding their access to
organs.22 Moreover, they should be secured access to organs for transplantation under the same criteria
that non-incarcerated individuals operate within. Policy makers weigh public need and public opinion in
developing and implementing solutions.23 Therefore, there must be a cultural shift in the current way

19

Marc J. Posner, Comment, The Estelle Medical Professional Judgment Standard: The Right of Those in State
Custody to Receive High-Cost Medical Treatments, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 347, 351 (1992) (“Once the doctor has
become involved in the treatment process (by actually prescribing treatment or by the state's attempt to influence the
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Jeffrey Kahn, Ethical Issues in Dialysis: The Ethics of Organ Transplantation for Prisoners, in SEMINARS IN
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organ transplants for prisoners lies in how we understand society’s commitments to prisoners’ health and health care,
and whether being incarcerated changes the priority of a patient waiting for a transplant.”)
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N.N. Dubler & B. Heyman, End-of-Life Care in Prisons and Jails, in Clinical Practice, in CORRECTIONAL
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Policy, 9 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 39, 68-69 (2008).
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prisoners and their rights are perceived for any new policies to come to fruition. Part II explores the
current organ transplant and allocation process in the United States, the aging prison population, and
prevailing societal attitudes towards prison health care and organ transplants. Part III explores the legal
rights of prisoners to organ transplants. In particular, it explores the origins of the ban on “cruel and
unusual punishment” and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence developing the concept and its application to
prisoner medical care. This section also highlights the current OPTN/UNOS allocation policies for
prisoners as organ recipients and various international law covenants and treaties on the subject. Part IV
seeks to apply the Eighth Amendment right to adequate health care to the issue of organ transplantation
for prisoners. Moreover, it seeks to dispel the many prevailing arguments against prisoner transplantation,
including the issues of costs and scarcity. Finally, it explores the tension between professional medical
ethics and the realities of incarceration.

II.

BACKGROUND
Understanding the issue of organ transplants in prisoners necessitates an understanding of the

organ transplant process and allocation system, the make-up of the United States prison population,
ethical dilemmas, and the social and political attitudes towards their medical treatment.
A.

Organ Transplantation in the United States

The idea of organ transplantation has been around since the time of the Ancient Greeks but
attempts at transplantation were unsuccessful for thousands of years.24 The first successful organ
transplant did not occur until 1954 in the United States; a kidney transplant from a donor to his identical
twin brother.25 The successful procedure was hailed as one of the greatest achievements in modern
surgery.26 However, fierce political and philosophical debate on a multitude of unique issues followed.

24

STEVE FARBER & HARLAN ABRAHAMS, ON THE LIST: FIXING AMERICA'S FAILING ORGAN TRANSPLANT SYSTEM
17-18 (2009).
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Health Technology Achievements, NATIONALACADEMIES.ORG,
http://www.nationalacademies.org/greatachievements/ga_16_3.html (last visited November 30, 2013).
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Debates stemming from resource allocation to organ property rights began dominating the public
discourse regarding transplants.27 The realities of a severely limited supply and a growing demand
spawned a legitimate fear of the potential lengths and abuses to which society could go in procuring such
a valuable commodity. These included fears of a burgeoning black market for organs28, recipient
discrimination29, and illegal procurement methods such as murder, theft, and organ harvesting.30
i.

National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA)

Today, organ transplantation is no longer considered an experimental treatment.31 It is a common,
acceptable, and successful treatment option for end-stage organ failure.32 In 2012, there were 28,053 lifesaving organ transplants from 14,015 donors (living and deceased).33 This is largely attributable to
cultural acceptance, medical advances, and legal and political evolution. Organ transplants are one of the
most regulated areas of health care today.34
Congress, mindful of the potential abuses in organ procurement and inequities in organ
distribution, passed the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) in 1984.35 NOTA included
language that made it a crime for “any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce.”36 It also provided a much-needed framework for the transfer, allocation, and transplantation
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Gwen Mayes, Buying and Selling Organs for Transplantation in the US: National Organ Transplant Act of 1984
(NOTA) Bans Buying and Selling, MEDSCAPE.ORG, http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/465200_2.
28
Larry Rohter, THE ORGAN TRADE: A Global Black Market; Tracking the Sale of a Kidney On a Path of Poverty
and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/world/organ-trade-global-black-markettracking-sale-kidney-path-poverty-hope.html.
29
Charles T. Carlstrom & Christy D. Rollow, The Rationing of Transplantable Organs: A Troubled Lineup, 17
CATO J. 163 (2007), available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1997/11/cj17n23.pdf.
30
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Final Rule on the Organ Allocation System, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 751, 751 (2001) (“Organ transplantation, once a risky
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Douglas, supra note 15, at 542.
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2012 Annual Report, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 4 (Feb. 2013),
http://www.unos.org/docs/AnnualReport2012.pdf [hereinafter UNOS Annual Report].
34
Legislation and Policy, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov/legislation (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
35
Mayes, supra note 27, at 2.
36
National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 274(e) (2006).
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of organs within the federal system. To this end, the Act established the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN) to maintain a national registry for organ matching. 37 The Act called for
the OPTN Network to be managed and operated by a private, non-profit organization under federal
contract.38 Congress purposely chose the OPTN Network to be managed by a private organization to
protect the organ allocation system from potential political interference.39
ii.

United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS)

The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) is a nonprofit organization authorized by NOTA
and contracted with the federal government to manage the OPTN Network.40 UNOS’s responsibilities
include maintaining a list of individuals waiting for transplants, operating a system for matching donated
organs with individuals on the waiting list, establishing medical criteria for allocating organs, collecting
and analyzing data on organs donated and transplanted, and implementing methods to increase supply.41
UNOS is also involved in most other aspects of the organ transplant process: requiring specific
credentials of transplant surgeons and physicians, providing assistance to patients, monitoring transplant
program compliance, and providing education to the public and health care professionals.42
Every transplant program, procurement organization, and tissue-typing laboratory in the United
States participates in UNOS.43 UNOS coordinates organ transplant efforts with 58 “organ procurement
organizations” (OPOs) and 250 transplant centers—medical facilities that maintain organ transplantation

37

Id. at § 372.
Id. at § 274(e).
39
Wright, supra note 6, at 1255. (“Because UNOS is an independent, non-profit agency, its operations and policies
are to some measure insulated from the political process.”)
40
About Us, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/about/index/.php (last visited Nov. 30,
2013).
41
RANDALL B. WILLIAMSON, ORGAN TRANSPLANT PROGRAMS: FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE ACTED TO IMPROVE
OVERSIGHT, BUT IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES REMAIN 9-11 (Apr. 28, 2008).
42
Id. at 10.
43
Id. at 9.
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programs.44 Members also include professional scientific and medical organizations and individuals
interested in organ donation or transplantations.45
iii.

The Waiting List

28,053 organ transplants were performed in 2012,46 however, over 120,000 patients remain on the
waiting list.47 The swelling demand for organs continue to exceed the available supply. Thousands of
people, including those incarcerated, die each year while waiting for a suitable organ to become
available.48
a.

Waiting List Eligibility: Transplant Centers

For most transplant candidates, including prisoners, the first step to receive an organ transplant is
to get on the OPTN/UNOS transplant waiting list.49 This is a computer database that contains medical
information on every person waiting for any type of organ transplant in the United States.50 A physician
must give a patient a referral to be seen by a “transplant center” (also referred to as a “transplant
hospital”) for an evaluation.51 Over 250 transplant centers exist in the United States.52 The medical staff
at the transplant center determines whether the patient is an eligible candidate for entry onto the waiting
list.53 The primary objective of the evaluation is to determine whether an organ transplant is medically
necessary and likely to succeed.54 The evaluation usually consists of (but not limited to): blood & tissue

44

Talking About Transplantation: What Every Patient Needs to Know, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING 10
(Feb. 2013), http://www.unos.org/docs/WEPNTK.pdf. [hereinafter UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know].
45
Williamson, supra note 41, at 9.
46
UNOS Annual Report, supra note 33, at 4.
47
UNITED NETWORK OF ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).
48
Legislation & Policy, supra note 34. (“[A]n average of 18 people die each day waiting for transplants that can't
take place because of the shortage of donated organs.”)
49
The National Waiting List, TRANSPLANTLIVING.ORG, http://www.transplantliving.org/before-thetransplant/getting-on-the-list/the-national-waiting-list/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Transplant Living:
National Waiting List].
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know, supra note 44, at 10.
53
The National Waiting List, supra note 49.
54
UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know, supra note 44, at 11.
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typing, dental exams, chest x-rays, cardiac & pulmonary work-up, infectious disease testing, genderspecific testing, and a psychological evaluation.55
Non-medical factors are also generally evaluated to determine the probability of a good outcome
post-organ surgery prior to wait list entry.56 OPTN/UNOS recognizes that life expectancy,
behavior/character flaws, likelihood of compliance with medical advice, repeat transplantation, and the
availability of alternative therapies, can influence eligibility determinations.57 However, UNOS stresses
that such non-medical factors are to be applied broadly and universally—not directed to any particular
class of individuals.58
The patient’s ability to pay is often a controlling factor either by express policies at the transplant
center or by limiting circumstance.59 Although every transplant center operates within a broad UNOS
framework of rules, they each have certain discretion to apply their own criteria.60 A patient’s ability to
pay is a legal and accepted criterion.61 Many transplant centers expressly require a patient to demonstrate
an ability to pay for the transplant operation.62 Other transplant centers, such as the University of
Michigan Transplant Center, try work with the patient to help provide some financial assistance or help
navigate governmental assistance.63 Well-to-do patients are better positioned to explore various
transplant centers and find centers with policies favorable to their situation.64 Lower-income individuals

55

Id. at 12.
OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee General Considerations in Assessment for Transplant Candidacy, ORGAN
PROCUREMENT AND TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=5
(last visited Nov. 30, 2013). (“There is general agreement that non-medical transplant candidate criteria need to be
evaluated. The legitimate substance of such an evaluation could cover a very wide range of topics.”)
57
Id.
58
Id. (“To the greatest extent possible, any acceptance criteria should be broad and universal…because we are
serving individual human beings with highly complex medical situations, a process of individual evaluation must be
maintained within the broad parameters.”)
59
Joy Victory, Need an Organ? It Helps to Be Rich, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2006),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=1514702&page=2.
60
Id. at 1. (“Each center sets its own criteria, which often include the patient's ability to pay.”)
61
Id.
62
Gina Kolata, Getting on a Transplant List is the First of Many Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1995,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/10/sports/getting-on-a-transplant-list-is-the-first-of-many-hurdles.html.
63
Victory, supra note 59, at 2.
64
Id. at 1. (“Centers have different practices. And if you're a well-to-do patient, you can shop around to centers. But
if you don't have any money, you will go wherever is closest, and their policies are what you are stuck with.")
56
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may not have the ability or resources to “shop” transplant facilities and are often pinned to policies at
transplant centers conveniently located.65
Many prisoners, on the other hand, do not have present financial capacity to fund such procedures.
They often have their livelihoods stripped when entering the prison system and are at the mercy of the
government to provide medical services on their behalf. However, the government does not always
intervene. For example, James Earl Ray was medically qualified for a liver transplant but because he
could not finance the operation, he was denied the organ transplant.66 The state refused to pay.67
b.

Transplant Eligibility: Wait Times

The waiting list is not the typical waiting list found at the DMV or at the local deli. It is not a list
where a patient simply waits his or her turn and is called on by order of placement on the list. There is no
number or rank. The waiting list is a large pool of patients in a database containing the medical
information of every person in the United States who is seeking an organ for transplantation.68 Each
candidate’s medical prognosis and situation is unique, therefore, waiting times can vary and is dependent
on a number of factors.69
Some general principles guide the distribution or organs. A patient’s medical urgency, blood
tissue, size, time on the waiting list, age, and geographic proximity to the donor are taken into
consideration.70 However, specifics on transplant eligibility and wait times vary by organ.71 UNOS has
developed specific policies and guidance for each individual organ, taking into consideration a patient’s
unique medical needs.72 For example, patients with kidney/renal failure can typically maintain dialysis
treatments for a period of time before a kidney becomes available; priority for patients in need of livers
65

Id.
Wright, supra note 6, at 1251.
67
Id.
68
Transplant Living: National Waiting List, supra note 49.
69
Organ Type and Waiting Time, TRANSPLANTLIVING.ORG, http://www.transplantliving.org/before-thetransplant/about-organ-allocation/waiting-for-an-organ/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). [hereinafter Transplant Living:
Organ Type and Waiting Time].
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know, supra note 44, at 10.
66
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often depend on their “Model for End-Stage Liver Disease” (MELD) score that measure the degree of
medical urgency coupled with geography; priority for patients in need of hearts often depend on the
geography of the donor and the patient coupled with medical urgency.73
1.

Discrimination

In 1995, baseball Hall-of-Famer, Mickey Mantle was diagnosed with end-stage liver disease due
to liver cancer complicated by alcoholism.74 He was placed on the transplant waiting list for only two
days before he underwent a liver transplant procedure.75 The average waiting time for a liver transplant at
the time was 67 days.76 Mantle died two months after his transplant surgery from liver cancer.77 UNOS
policies vehemently prohibit discrimination or favoritism of transplant recipients.78 “Candidates for
transplantation shall not differ on the basis of a candidate’s citizenship or residency status in the United
States…[a]llocation shall not be influenced by favoritism or discrimination based on political influence,
national origin, race, sex, religion, or financial status.”79 However, cases like Mantle’s raise public
distrust and questions about the discrepancy in access to organs between the well-to-do, famous, and the
poor.
iv.

Costs of Organ Transplantation

Organ transplant procedures are among the most expensive medical procedures available. High
costs are primarily incurred for the procurement of the organ itself, the relative difficulty of the procedure,
and the skill level required of the surgeon.80 Overall transplant costs include the initial evaluation,

73

Transplant Living: Organ Type and Waiting Time, supra note 69.
Kolata, supra note 62.
75
Id.
76
Carlstrom & Rollow, supra note 29, at 163.
77
Id.
78
Policies and Bylaws §6.2.1, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING,
http://www.unos.org/About/policy_policies.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2013).
79
Id.
80
Organ Transplantation: The Process, ORGANDONOR.GOV,
http://organdonor.gov/about/transplantationprocess.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). (“Costs include laboratory
tests, organ procurement, transplant surgeons and other operating room personnel, in-hospital stays, transportation to
and from the transplant hospital for surgery and for checkups, rehabilitation, including physical or occupational
74
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surgery, postoperative care, tests and medication.81 The costs vary for each patient based on the patient’s
individual medical needs and the type of organ needed for transplant.82 Transplant costs also vary due to
limited supplies of available organs. For example, a kidney transplant is among the least expensive organ
transplant due to the relatively higher volume of supply compared to other organs.83 The average cost of
a kidney transplant is $260,000 where a heart transplant averages around $1 million.84
Transplant centers have the discretion to first establish a patient’s ability to pay for the transplant
procedure prior entry on the organ waiting list.85 A patient’s ability to pay depends on the scope of their
health insurance coverage (private or public) or ability to pay out-of-pocket.86 If a patient does have
medical insurance, coverage for an organ transplant can sometimes depends on whether states recognize
an organ transplant as an “essential health benefit.”87 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(PPACA) requires all health plans to cover “essential health benefits” which must include items and
services within at least the following ten categories: ambulatory patient services; emergency services;
hospitalization; maternity and newborn care; mental health and substance use disorder services;
prescription drugs; rehabilitative services and devices; laboratory services; preventive and wellness
services and chronic disease management; and pediatric services.88 However, whether a transplant is
covered largely depends on what the state considers an essential health benefit.89 States are guided by a

therapy; and medications, including immunosuppressive or anti-rejection drugs which may cost up to $2,500 per
month.”)
81
Id.
82
UNOS What Every Patient Needs to Know, supra note 44, at 30. (Chart of estimated costs per organ)
83
Financing a Transplant, TRANSPLANTLIVING.ORG, http://www.transplantliving.org/before-thetransplant/financing-a-transplant/the-costs/ (last visited, Nov. 20, 2013).
84
Id.
85
Victory, supra note 59.
86
RW Evans, Abstract, Organ transplantation costs, insurance coverage, and reimbursement, BATTELLE SEATTLE
RESEARCH CENTEr (1990), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2103158.
87
Current Policy Issues, AMERICAN KIDNEY FUND, http://www.kidneyfund.org/advocacy/policy-and-issues/policyissues.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). [hereinafter American Kidney Fund Policy Issues].
88
What Does Marketplace Health Insurance Cover, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/what-doesmarketplace-health-insurance-cover/ (last visited Dec 1, 2013).
89
American Kidney Fund Policy Issues, supra note 87. (“CMS outlined an approach that would give each State the
flexibility to define its essential health benefits package through the selection of an existing benchmark plan, rather
than prescribe a specific list of items and services that all health plans must provide.”)
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benchmarking plan rather than a specific list of items and services when prescribing what is mandatorily
covered.90
Federal insurance programs, including Medicare and Medicaid have covered end-stage renal
disease and certain transplant procedures for over four decades.91 In 1972, Medicare was amended to
cover people with end-stage renal disease regardless of their age.92 Notably, Medicaid—a cooperative
program between states and the federal government—funds only certain health care expenses for lowincome or disabled persons.93 The states have discretion to develop eligibility and coverage criteria.94
Medicare currently covers organ transplants under certain circumstances in approved facilities: heart, lung,
kidney, pancreas, intestine, and liver.95 Medicare transplant coverage includes: diagnostics,
immunosuppressive drugs, follow-up care, and the procurement of organs and tissues.96
a.

Costs for Prisoners

Whether a prisoner is covered for organ transplantation often depends on the state system and the
policies therein. In federal prisons, the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ general policy is not to provide organ
transplants for federal inmates unless inconsistent with evolving community standards or the Medical
Director makes an exception.97 The determination is usually made on a case-by-case basis and is based

90

Id.
Timeline of Historical Events, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://organdonor.gov/legislation/timeline.html (last visited
Dec. 1, 2013).
92
H. Bradley Southern, Comment, Medicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Program: Its Development and
Implications for Health Care Policy, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 225, 226 (1989).
93
Melissa Wong, Comment, Coverage for Kidneys: The Intersection of Insurance and Organ Transplantation, 16
CONN. INS. L.J. 535, 546 (2010) (“Medicaid is a cooperative program between the federal government and
individual states to fund certain health care expenses for low-income or disabled persons who qualify.”)
94
Id. at 546. (“While the federal government may set broad policies and ensure state compliance with the Medicaid
statute, it is up to the states to develop state eligibility and coverage criteria subject to federal approval and
reimbursement.”)
95
Your Medicare Coverage: Transplants, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/coverage/transplantsadults.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
96
Id.
97
Press Release, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Statement of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, (Nov. 18, 1998), available
at http://www.bop.gov/news/press/press_releases/ipaorg.jsp.
91
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on factors including, the preservation of life, prevention of irreparable harm, or whether the procedure is
experimental.98
Some states attempt to address organ transplants for prisoners directly through legislation or
regulation. Washington State, for example, offers an “Offender Health Plan” which lists the health
services and scope of health coverage available for inmates within the state.99 The Offender Health Plan
specifically states that organ transplants are not to be funded by the state unless the “Utilization Review
Committee” specifically authorizes the individual prisoner/patient for transplant.100 The Committee looks
at alternative methods of securing funding for the organ transplant, such as, private insurance, social
service groups, and nonprofit organizations.101 If funding cannot be secured through alternative sources,
the Committee has the discretion to pay for or deny the transplant.102 For the most of the country, no
formulaic policies exist as to state-funded organ transplants for the incarcerated—most opting for caseby-case review.103
The issue as to whether organ transplants for the incarcerated should be state funded is heavily
contested. What follows is the argument that a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and
unusual punishment would be violated if a prisoner/patient could not afford his or her lifesaving
procedure. This is explored in-depth within the Constitutional Analysis in Part III.

B.

The Aging Prison Population

As the average age of the prison population rises to record levels, the reality faced by the
government is that their inmates are becoming old and expensive to care for. Over 1.5 million people are

98

Id.
Washington State Dep't of Corrections, Offender Health Plan § 3 (Dec. 13, 1996).
100
Id. § 4.
101
Wright, supra note 6, at 1260. (“The Committee will first seek alternative methods of funding, such as private
insurance or veterans groups.”)
102
Id.
103
Id. at 1261. (“[I]ndividualized consideration of each inmate's case…will probably continue to be the predominant
method of dealing with the funding question, at least until states see a need to formulate specific, written policies.”)
99
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incarcerated in the United States—among the highest concentration of prisoners in the world.104 Adding
additional strain on the prison system is that over 8% of the total prison population is above the age of
55.105 The number of prisoners 55 and older is growing at exponential rates compared to the total prison
population.106 The overall prison population has increased 42.1% from 1995 to 2010.107 The prison
population of inmates 55 or older grew a staggering 282% during the same time span.108 The number of
older prisoners is growing at a faster rate than the same age demographic within the general U.S.
population.109 As prisoners age, they are at increasing risk of developing various disabilities and serious
illnesses that require resource intensive medical therapies.110
i.

Reasons for the Aging Prison Population

There are varied reasons for the dramatic rise in the older inmate population. One of the main
factors has been the adoption of “tough on crime” policies implemented by state and federal legislators in
an attempt to curb rising crime rates in the 1980s.111 The aggressive laws harshened punishments and
increased the likelihood and length of prison sentences for criminal activity.
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John V. Jacobi, Prison Health, Public Health: Obligations and Opportunities, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 447, 449
(2005) (“Prison and jail populations increased more than four-fold from 1980 to 2003, from about 500,000 in 1980
to over 2,000,000 in 2003. The rate of incarceration in the United States grew to 726 persons per 100,000 by 2004,
far outstripping the imprisonment rates in every other country in the world for which such statistics are
maintained.”)
105
OLD BEHIND BARS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 6 (January 2012), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usprisons0112webwcover_0_0.pdf. (“8 percent of sentenced state and
federal prisoners are age 55 or older, more than doubling from 3 percent in 1995.”) [hereinafter HRW Old Behind
Bars].
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Id. at 19. (“In the last fifteen years, the number of men and women age 55 years or older in US prisons has grown
markedly, and at an increasingly rapid pace. In 1995, there were 32,600. By 2010, there were 124,400.”)
107
Id. at 20. (“The number of prisoners age 55 or older grew at a much faster rate than the total prison population,
growing by 282 percent compared to a 42.1 percent increase in the prison population.”)
108
Id.
109
Id. (“The number of older prisoners is growing faster than the number of older persons in the US population, as is
evident from the growth in incarceration rates relative to population.”)
110
Id. at 43. (“As persons age, they are at increasing risk of developing various illnesses and disabilities.”)
111
Felicia Cohn, The Ethics of End-of-Life Care for Prison Inmates, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 252, 253 (1999) (“This
increase can be attributed to several policy trends of the 1980s. These include limits on judicial discretion in
sentencing and releases, restrictions on community-based intermediate sanctions, “get-tough-on-crime” campaigns,
“three-strikes-and-you-are-out” legislation, and state and federal laws mandating longer sentences for drug-related
criminal convictions.”)
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Tough-on-crime policies have contributed dramatically to the overcrowded prison system.112
“Three-strikes” laws sent many repeat felony offenders to serve life sentences; “truth in sentencing” laws
made it much more difficult for a prisoner to be released on parole without serving at least 85% of his or
her sentence; and the establishment of mandatory minimum sentences and increased life-without-parole
sentences.113 Federal prisoners serving life-sentences have no prospect of release in their lifetime because
the federal system does not have parole.114 In state systems where parole is offered, many states have
adopted harsher parole revocation policies that have returned high percentages of released offenders back
to prison for parole violations.115 These policies have lead to an irreversible overcrowded prison
environment and an increased financial burden on federal and state governments to provide care for them.
Crime rates have declined since tough-on-crime laws began to be passed.116 However, it is
debated as to whether these “front-end” tough-on-crime policies are directly attributable to the reduction
in crime rates or attributed to other variables and societal trends.117
ii.

Costs of Incarcerating the Elderly

The government spends over $60 billion a year on its prison system.118 Anywhere from 9-30% of
prison budgets are spent on inmate health care.119 The average costs for housing aging prisoners is up to
112

Id.
HRW Old Behind Bars, supra note 106, at 24. (“State and federal legislators adopted laws that increased the
likelihood and length of prison sentences, including by establishing mandatory minimum sentences and three strikes
laws, and by increasing the number of crimes punished with life and life- without-parole sentences. In addition to
these “front end” policy changes, the legislators sought to increase the amount of time prisoners would serve in
prison before release, for example by establishing truth-in-sentencing conditions that require 85 percent or more of a
prison sentence be served before the inmate becomes eligible for release, and by making some crimes ineligible for
parole. Harsh parole revocation policies were also adopted that returned high percentages of released offenders to
prison for technical parole violations.”)
114
Id. at 36.
115
Id. at 24.
116
Id. (“These sentencing and release policies help explain why the US prison population has grown six-fold since
1980, despite declining crime rates.”)
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Anthony Nagorski, Comment, Arguments Against the Use of Recidivist Statutes That Contain Mandatory
Minimum Sentences, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 214, 227 (2010) (“[L]ower rates could be attributed to the
enactment of any number of new criminal statutes or deterrence methods, not necessarily due to the Three Strikes
laws.”)
118
Aging Inmate Committee, Aging Inmates: Correctional Issues and Initiatives, Md. B.J., November/December
2011, at 22. (“States spend over $60 billion per year to incarcerate their inmates.”)
119
Phil Schaenman et al, Opportunities for Cost Savings in Corrections Without Sacrificing Service Quality: Inmate
Health Care, URBAN INSTITUTE 3 (February 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412754113
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three times higher than housing younger inmates.120 The prison environment is often less conducive to
healthy living. Prisoners tend to “age” much more rapidly than those similarly aged outside the prison
system.121 Aging prisoners typically have serious health conditions, including, physiological and
psychological health conditions, associated with people at least a decade older.122 Moreover, the common
services for treating the elderly outside of prison—the need for walkers, wheelchairs, hearing aids, and
daily assistance such as going to the toilet and eating—are also necessary for many aging inmates.123
iii.

Methods for Addressing Increased Costs

Prisoners are entitled under the Eighth Amendment to receive health care to at a level comparable
to the care they could receive if not incarcerated.124 As prison populations rapidly rise and grow older,
the costs of addressing their health care will continue to rise.125 Some states and the federal government
have instituted cost saving methods to deal with this quandary.126
In 2014, Medicaid will expand the potential of medical coverage for inmates.127 Any inmate with
an income below 133% of the federal poverty line will become Medicaid eligible for treatment services
outside the prison.128 The cost-saving potential for states is great since many inmates will qualify.129

Inmate-Health-Care.pdf. (“Typically 9 to 30 percent of corrections costs go to inmate health care. This amounts to
hundreds of millions of dollars nationally.”)
120
HRW Old Behind Bars, supra note 106, at 72. (“Older prisoners are at least two to three times as expensive to
incarcerate as younger prisoners, primarily because of their greater medical needs.”)
121
Id. at 17. ("[I]ncarcerated men and women typically have physiological and mental health conditions that are
associated with people at least a decade older in the community.")
122
Id.
123
Id. at 4. (“Prisons in the United States contain an ever growing number of aging men and women who cannot
readily climb stairs, haul themselves to the top bunk, or walk long distances to meals or the pill line…who need
wheelchairs, walkers, canes, portable oxygen, and hearing aids; who cannot get dressed, go to the bathroom, or
bathe without help.”)
124
Shaenman et al, supra note 119, at 3. (“Prisons and jails are required to provide health care to inmates at a level
comparable to the care they could receive in the community if not incarcerated. It is considered an Eighth
Amendment issue regarding cruel and unusual punishment.”)
125
Carrie Abner, Graying Prisons, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS 11 (December 2006), available at
http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/sn0611GrayingPrisons.pdf. (“As America’s prisoners continue to grow
older and sicker, the costs to states will continue to rise.”)
126
Id.
127
HRW OLD BEHIND BARS, supra note 106, at 79. (“In 2014, anyone with an income below 133 percent of the
federal poverty line will become Medicaid eligible, which probably includes most inmates since they have little or
no income.”)
128
Id.
129
Id.
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However, the cost savings would be minimized due to costs of transporting prisoners to and from outside
medical facilities safely and securely.130
The Federal Bureau of Prisons and some states have expanded medical and age criteria to
increase eligibility for an early “compassionate release” program (or “medical parole”).131 Prisoners
released under this program could be eligible for Medicare, Social Security, or veterans’ benefits,
relieving a portion of the states’ financial burden for their care.132 Although the federal compassionate
release program has been around since 1984, the program is whittled in bureaucracy, controversy, and
implemented inconsistently.133 Only two-dozen prisoners are released each year on compassionate
grounds.134 And nearly 1 in 8 prisoners die while awaiting a decision.135

C.

Common Public Attitudes of Transplants for the Incarcerated

The term “waiting list” alone makes it clear that organs are a precious and rare commodity.
There are many more people on the waiting list than there are available organs. And many die each year
while waiting for an organ to become available. This phenomenon creates a logical tension among
awaiting recipients regarding eligibility hierarchy. Media reports of Raj Rajaratnam, a wealthy whitecollar convict serving 11 years in federal prison for insider trading, attempting to secure a kidney
transplant,136 and the unidentified California inmate who obtained a $1 million heart transplant but died a
year later,137 sparked intense public backlash. Some prisoners report that they receive better and more
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Id. (“While Medicaid may help states defray some of the costs associated with hospital care provided outside the
prison system, it will do nothing to relieve states of the considerable costs of transporting incarcerated men and
women to and from outside service providers, nor will it help with the costs of providing officers to guard offenders
while they are receiving community-based treatment.”)
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Richard A. Serrano, Government Explores Early Release For More Aging Prisoners, L.A. Times, Nov. 13 2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/nov/12/nation/la-na-prisoners-release-20131113.
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Abner, supra note 125, at 11. (“Proponents for this approach argue that once released, inmates may be eligible
for Medicare, Social Security or veterans benefits, relieving a portion of the states’ financial burden for their care.”)
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Serrano, supra note 131. (“[T]he release program has been bogged down in bureaucracy and that wardens and
judges remain reluctant to free inmates.”)
134
Id.
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Id.
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Aaron Smith, Rajaratnam's kidney transplant could cost taxpayers $300,000, CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2011, 5:12
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/21/news/companies/rajaratnam_kidney_taxpayer/.
137
Douglas, supra note 15, at 539.
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available medical care in prison than they do outside prison walls.138 There is an inherent sense of
injustice when criminals secure scarce resources and available public finances from law-abiding citizens.
On the other side of the debate is the argument that only “objective medical judgment” should
guide eligibility decisions for securing organs. Non-medical factors, including criminal records or
incarceration status, should not be considered. If such factors control eligibility, this could open up a
litany of factors that may prevent certain social or economic classes from securing lifesaving transplant
procedures. Fundamental human rights and civil rights dictate that one’s social status should not be a
controlling factor in medical decisions. Due to a prisoner’s loss of freedom, the government has the
responsibility to make sure their prisoners are not suffering while under their control. As wards of the
state, a prisoner is under the complete control and dominion of the state—analogous to the parent/child
relationship.139 Prisoners cannot independently secure medical services; they are reliant on the system
and its practitioners. If correctional facilities fail to provide proper medical care, incarcerations could
equate to a death sentence.140

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
Every prisoner in the United States has an Eighth Amendment right to adequate health care.141 It

is considered “cruel and unusual punishment” for the government to ignore or interfere with this right –
especially interfering with a physician’s prescribed treatment for a prisoner with a serious condition.142
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Smith, supra note 136. (“Ex-prisoner, Levine, states, “I tell people that I had better medical care in prison," he
said. "Going to prison probably did save my life.")
139
McKinney, et al, supra note 22, at 64. (“Offenders become wards of the state and must depend on the state the
same as a child in the state's custody.”)
140
Id. at 65. (“The courts recognize the ethical problems associated with punishing a person by taking away his or
her liberty and denying him basic necessities of life. If correctional facilities fail to provide proper medical care,
every incarceration could become a death sentence.”)
141
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 19, at 349. (“[I]n Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held
that the Eighth Amendment required the federal government and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, the states to
provide medical care to prisoners.”)
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Plata, 131 U.S. at 1928. (“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that
dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment... A prison that deprives
prisoners basic sustenance, including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and
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18

However, despite Constitutional protections and evolving ethical and moral standards, the law is often
ignored.
A.

Constitutional Analysis

Prisoners are stripped of some of their constitutional rights while incarcerated. However, their
right to humane treatment endures regardless of their incarceration status and their Eighth Amendment
right against cruel and unusual punishment, which includes the right to receive adequate medical
treatment, attaches.
i.

Eighth Amendment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment

The phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1989:
“Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted.”143 In the United States, the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution embodies “cruel and unusual punishment”: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”144 Early court cases limited
Eighth Amendment protections due to the “hands-off doctrine.”145 According to the doctrine, the court
lacked any jurisdiction to supervise the internal management of the criminal justice system. 146 Any issues
relating to the supervision of prisoners and internal prison affairs were beyond judicial review.147 The
judiciary has evolved from the “hands-off doctrine.”148 It no longer precludes judicial review of
constitutional infringements on prisoners’ rights.149
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Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
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Michael Cameron Friedman, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Prison Medical Care:
Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921, 927 (1992) (“Before the 1960s, courts
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Id.
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Friedman, supra note 145, at 928. (“Since the erosion of the hands-off doctrine, however, courts have shown
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Id.
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In addition to the hands off doctrine, early Eighth Amendment cases focused primarily on
determining whether existing execution methods were “inherently cruel” to pass constitutional muster.150
However, in 1910, the Supreme Court in Weems v. United States recognized the need for the Eighth
Amendment to have wider application than its narrow interpretation.151 The Court began to reject the
proposition that the Eighth Amendment only reaches punishments that are inhuman and barbarous.
Rather, the Weems Court maintained that the Constitution is not “fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a human justice.”152
In 1958, the Supreme Court in Trop v. Dulles, in dicta, observed the concept of expanding Eighth
Amendment application to the proportionality of punishments and substantive limits.153 The Trop Court
dispelled any suggestion that a punishment must produce physical or mental suffering for the Eighth
Amendment protection to attach.154 Rather, Justice Warren suggested that “the [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”155 The Court began to focus less on whether physical and mental mistreatment existed but
whether a punishment was “degrading to human dignity.”156
a.

Deliberate Indifference Standard: Estelle v. Gamble
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William H. Danne, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3d 111 (1973).
(“The earliest, and still most frequently resorted to, test for determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual
is an essentially subjective one which is grounded upon the concept that some punishments are so inherently cruel
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Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
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Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972). (“The primary principle is that a punishment must not be so severe
as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings. Pain, certainly, may be a factor in the judgment. The infliction of
an extremely severe punishment will often entail physical suffering. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S., at 366,
30 S.Ct., at 549.11 Yet the Framers also knew ‘that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those
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physical mistreatment, no primitive torture,’ Trop v. Dulles, supra, 356 U.S. at 101, 78 S.Ct., at 598, severe mental
pain may be inherent in the infliction of a particular punishment. See Weems v. United States, supra, 217 U.S., at
366, 30 S.Ct., at 549.”)
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In 1976, the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble extended Eighth Amendment protections to a
prisoner’s right to adequate health care.157 Estelle challenged the old tradition of the ‘hands-off‘ doctrine
of courts deferring to prison administrators' their actions.158 Estelle v. Gamble involved a state prisoner
seeking treatment for back injuries sustained during an accident that occurred while he was doing prison
work.159 He sought treatment for his injuries and was seen by medical personnel multiple times, however,
he sued alleging that his medical treatment was inadequate.160 The Court, while rejecting his particular
claim, recognized for the first time that the Eighth Amendment afforded prisoners the right to adequate
health care.161
The Estelle Court implemented a decision-making test to field Eighth Amendment “cruel and
unusual punishment” questions as to whether a prisoner received unconstitutional health care.162 Also
known as the “deliberate indifference standard,” it requires that the complainant show the physician or
prison official displayed deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the prisoner and failed to
respond.163 The Court in Wilson v. Seiter, refined the deliberate indifference standard in two prongs –
both of which must be met for a prisoner to succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim of inadequate health
care.164 (1) The complaining party must be able to demonstrate a “serious medical need” (objective), and
(2) the defendant/government must have actual knowledge or awareness of the complaining party’s
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serious medical need, and acts or omissions that indicate a failure to avert, or to take serious steps to avert,
a serious risk of harm to the offender (subjective).165 In other words, if a correctional official knew or
should have known about a prisoner’s serious medical needs, and either, disregards it, interferes with
treatment, or provides care below the standard of care, that could constitute a violation of the prisoner’s
Eighth Amendment rights.
b.

Evolution of the Deliberate Indifference Standard

Post Estelle cases broadened the scope of the deliberate indifference standard and in some cases
narrowed it.
1.

Difference in Medical Opinion

In Estelle, the prisoner claimed that the treating physician acted with deliberate indifference in the
treatment of his back injury by failing to order additional diagnostics for his lower back.166 The Court
noted that the mere disagreement with the medical judgment of the treating physician did not constitute a
deliberate indifference.167 A difference of opinion arising between medical professionals or between the
inmate and the prison health care provider is also not necessarily a deliberate indifference.168
2.

Requests for Experimental Treatment

Cases involving a refusal of a prisoner’s request for “experimental treatment” have also been held
to not qualify as a deliberate indifference.169 In Hawley v. Evans, an HIV patient was seeking a drug that
at the time was deemed “experimental” in the treatment against HIV/AIDS.170 The Court denied his
165

Id.
Estelle, 29 U.S. at 101.
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Douglas, supra note 6, at 549-50. (“Although some courts still speak of medical judgment, many cases instead
refer to this concept as a “difference of opinion.” Where a decision concerning treatment or medication manifests
nothing more than a difference of medical opinion, the courts have consistently held that this difference of opinion
does not constitute deliberate indifference. Closer examination of post-Estelle cases reveal two occasions in which a
difference of opinion may arise.”)
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Id. at 550.
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Id. at 551. (“Cases involving experimental treatment most frequently involve a prisoner's request for cutting-edge
medication.88 When faced with such a demand, courts have held that refusal to provide prisoners with experimental
treatment does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”)
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Hawley v. Evans, 716 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
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request holding that the drug [at the time] was experimental and that the Eighth Amendment does not
extend to experimental treatments.171 In Harris v. Thigpen, the court ruled that prisoners are not entitled
to “state of the art” treatment but only reasonable care according to the community standard.172
3.

Providing Easier and Less Efficacious Treatment

Cases where prison officials choose to provide “easier and less efficacious treatment” than other
available options, constituted a deliberate indifference.173 In Williams v. Vincent, the case involved where
a prisoner’s ear was severed in a prison fight.174 Rather than attempting to repair and reattach the ear, the
physician threw away the severed ear and stitched up the stump.175 The court held that the physician
displayed deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s serious medical need by providing “easier and less
efficacious treatment” rather than attempting to reattach the ear.176
4.

Medical Decisions Based on Costs

The Supreme Court has not yet spoken directly to the issue of considering costs in a prisoners’
medical treatment.177 The Estelle Court did not mention costs when articulating the deliberate
indifference standard.178 However, the majority of lower court decisions at issue have interpreted Estelle
as to not allow the government to consider costs to allow a prisoners’ medical treatment to fall below a
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Id. at 544.
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Wright, supra note 6, at 1269. (“In Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the court balances individual and
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minimally adequate level.179 This is not to say that economic factors may not be considered in choosing
methods that achieve the same objective.180 However, the costs of protecting a prisoner’s constitutional
right to adequate health care does not justify a total denial of treatment.181
That the government should be responsible for funding a prisoner’s health care, including organ
transplant treatments, is supported by many post-Estelle cases. In Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional
Inmates v. Lanzaro, the court held that “prisons should be and are constitutionally required to provide for
[i.e., at the institution’s expense] all the serious medical needs of the inmates, whose imposed financial
dependency is a result of their incarceration.”182 In Anacta v. Prison Health Services, the Eleventh Circuit
held that refusing to provide a neurologic evaluation prescribed by a treating physician because the
prisoner could not pay for the services constituted a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.183
And in Martin v. DeBruyn, the court held that “[a] prison official who withholds necessary medical care,
for want of payment, from an inmate who could not pay would violate the inmate’s constitutional rights if
the inmate’s medical needs were serious.”184
c.

Deliberate Indifference in Organ Transplant Cases

Applying the deliberate indifference two prong test to a prisoner’s need for organ transplants
unequivocally attaches a constitutional right to receiving such treatment. The first prong of
“demonstrating a serious medical need” is easily met because an organ transplant is usually recommended
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Id.
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as a “last resort” treatment. In most cases, a person is unable to sustain life with a failing heart, liver, or
kidney.
The second prong, finding a deliberate indifference to the inmate’s serious medical condition by
failing to provide a prisoner with an organ transplant, can be analogized by the direction in which the
courts are moving.185 In Fernandez v. United States, a federal prisoner was in need of a life-saving heart
transplant.186 The prisoner was refused a medical furlough, a reduction in sentence, a parole, and a
pardon because he did not meet the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ requirement that a prisoner must
demonstrate an ability to pay for the procedure.187 The Eleventh Circuit held that the enforcement of the
Bureau’s guidelines denied the prisoner the opportunity to receive an organ transplant but did not
constitute a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs due to continuing treatment of his
illnesses.188
However, nine years later the Eighth Circuit expressed concern regarding the Bureau’s restrictive
policy regarding transplants in a series of cases.189 In Barron v. Keohane, Eighth Circuit Judge Richard
Arnold, in dicta, expressed concern over the Bureau’s policy: “[g]iven the Bureau's obligation to provide
medical care to prisoners, see 18 U.S.C. § 4042, denial of a transplant to an inmate who needs-but cannot
pay for-a transplant may raise constitutional concerns.”190 And again in Clark v. Hedrick, in dicta, Judge
Arnold stated: “[w]e remind the Bureau of Prisons that its policies in connection with transplants, if
applied inflexibly, may raise constitutional questions.”191
d.

Deference to Medical Judgment
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The right of prisoners to receive organ transplant can also be analogized by the great deference to
the medical judgment of the treating physician afforded by Estelle.192 Once a physician has diagnosed an
illness as serious and has ordered particular treatment, prison officials cannot violate, ignore, or interfere
with the order.193 The prisoner’s Eighth Amendment protections entitles him or her to receive the
treatment the medical professional decides is necessary for the treatment of a serious medical need.194
This especially applies to decisions not to afford Plaintiff an operation that would render the prisonerpatient’s condition irreparable,195 or cause him or her “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”196
Moreover, if a treating physician’s recommendation has not been flatly denied but delayed for nonmedical reasons, this constitutes a deliberate indifference.197
ii.

Fourteenth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of the federal government’s use of cruel and unusual
punishment and the right to health care for the incarcerated is also applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause.198 The Fourteenth Amendment regulates the conduct of the
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states in accordance with the Constitution.199 Therefore, prisoners may bring Eighth Amendment actions
against both federal and state prison authorities.200

B.

OPTN/UNOS Policy

The OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee directly addressed the ethical debate regarding organ
transplants for convicted criminals.201 In an official opinion paper on the subject, it labeled any type of
exclusion of criminals from medical treatment, including an organ transplant procedure, as not ethically
legitimate.202 “The UNOS allocation system is based on the principles of equity and medical utility.”203
Wealth, social status, citizenship, and status as a prisoner are not legitimate factors guiding allocation
decisions.204
The OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee acknowledged that non-medical decisions—prior to a
patient’s placement on the waitlist—could be made at the discretion of the transplant team so long as the
decisions are based on their relative impact to transplant outcomes.205 However, once a patient is placed
on the waitlist, the patient is eligible for the equitable allocation of organs.206

C.

International Law

Various international treaties and covenants also support the right of medical care for prisoners.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the “right of everyone to
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the highest attainable standards of health.”207 The United States has not ratified the ICESCR and,
therefore, is not legally binding.208 However, because the United States is a signatory, it undertakes a
number of legal obligations, including, refraining from undermining the intent and purpose of the
treaty.209
The International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, to which the United States is a party,
guarantees all persons the right to life, to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.210 People
deprived of their liberty, such as prisoners, must be treated with humanity and with respect and inherent
dignity.211 It specifically requires that governments provide “adequate medical care during detention.”212
The United States is also a party to the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).213 The CAT prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment.214 Failure to provide adequate medical care to prisoners is a violation of the CAT.215

IV.

ARGUMENT
Whatever ambivalent feelings individuals, communities, or government officials may have about

a prisoner’s access to organs, the law is quite clear on the subject. The Constitution, OPTN/UNOS
policies, and international law are clear – when based on purely objective medical criteria, a prisoner
cannot be interfered with or withheld from receiving a medically necessary organ transplant. In practice,
however, the law is often circumvented due to matters such as health care costs, organ scarcity, public
opposition, and value for life.

A.

Scope of “Adequate” Health Care for Prisoners
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Estelle v. Gamble effectively entitled prisoners to receive adequate medical care.216 The irony is
that no such right exists for the general public. In fact, many inmates receive better medical care while
behind bars than they had as a free member of society.217 In exchange, prisoners forfeit many of their
core rights and freedoms when incarcerated including their liberties and their right to vote. Although
imprisoning those who commit crimes is an effective method to keep the general public safe, in turn, the
government has an obligation to treat prisoners safe and humanely as well.218
The Supreme Court in Estelle did not set an exact scope of the medical treatment that should be
afforded to prisoners. The Court merely set the floor that the treatment of prisoners, including their
medical care, should not offend “evolving standards of decency”219 – which likely includes the provision
of health care up to the standards of care for the general public. Organ transplant is often a last resort in
treating a patient with end-stage organ failure. These are not simple surgeries nor are organ transplant
decisions taken lightly. Organ transplants are complex; they require heightened skill, attention, and
expense. Despite these complexities, organ transplantation has become the standard of care and, in most
cases, is the treatment of choice for end-stage organ disease.220 Advances in surgical and organpreservation techniques, improved immunosuppressive and antiviral regimens, and changes in donororgan allocation have improved the success rates of solid-organ transplantation.221 Transplantation
replaces end-stage disease with a more sustainable disease state and has substantial clinical advantages.222
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Organ transplants are woven into the fabric of available treatment options. As the Eighth Amendment
evolves contemporaneously with society, organ transplant treatments are also included.

B.

The Truth about Costs to the Taxpayer

Organ transplant procurement and procedures are among the most expensive medical treatments
available. An organ transplant procedure can range anywhere from $200,000 to over $1,000,000
depending on the organ transplant and the medical needs of the patient.223 In the case of the unknown
California inmate who received a $1 million heart transplant, much of the public outcry came as a result
of the taxpayers footing the bill. However, arguments over costs for organ transplants are often
misguided.
The issue is of “perceived” costs rather than “actual” costs.224 The government must provide
medical care for its incarcerated. Paying for a one-time organ transplant would, in theory, save the
government/taxpayer money compared to the annual expense of medically managing a chronically ill
prisoner with a failing organ. For example, treating a prisoner serving a life-sentence suffering from endstage kidney failure with dialysis treatments is estimated to cost over $120,000 per year for the life of the
prisoner-patient.225 The average cost for a kidney transplant procedure plus immunosuppressant therapy
costs just over $260,000 total.226 The net-cost savings alone make it economically advantageous for the
government to remove any barriers and encourage medically necessary organ transplants as a viable
treatment option for their prisoners.

C.

Scarcity Debate
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Every 10 minutes someone in the United States is added to the organ waiting list.227 Each day, an
average of 79 people receive an organ transplant.228 However, 18 people die every day waiting for a
transplant. The demand for organs well exceeds the available supply. The scarcity of available organs
creates an obvious tension regarding “worthiness” when allocation decisions are being made. A common,
yet dangerous, view is that those with more social or societal value are more deserving of organs;
prisoners who have committed crimes against society should not be placed above any law-abiding citizen
in seeking life-saving treatment. Any policy that assigns a lower priority to prisoners would be based on
the dangerous premise that prisoners are less valuable human beings. A precedent would be created
within the transplant system that social worth is a legitimate consideration when making organ allocation
decisions.229 The slippery slope arguments that flow from this view are obvious.
Using prejudices as the criteria to which the government decides what medical treatment will be
received and to who opens up a litany of opportunity to justify classism—government sanctioned
classism. Prisoners may not be the only population whose eligibility gets closely examined.230 Accepting
classism as “official government policy” has implications that stem much further from the prisoner-organ
transplant debate. Such a policy has the potential to be applied well beyond just the distribution or organs.

D.

Protecting Medical Ethics

The goals of capital punishment are contrary to the goals and aims of medicine and vice-versa.231
Physicians and health care providers in the prison system often experience tension between their oath to
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treat the individual patient with compassion and attention to their medical needs, and the realities of the
patient’s incarceration status.
However, a physician has a duty to do all that he or she can for the benefit of the patient. The
AMA Code of Ethics suggests that policies that allocate limited resources have the potential to limit a
physician’s ability to adequately fulfill their obligation to their patients.232 The treating physician must
remain a patient advocate and therefore not partake in any allocation decisions.233 Moreover, it is not in
the physician’s purview to consider non-medical criteria, such as the ability to pay, age, social worth,
perceived obstacles to treatment.234 A physician must not be asked to balance competing non-medical
interests of a prisoner seeking an organ transplant; the government and UNOS is charged with making
such determinations. While there may be strong and varying opinions on the subject, it is not the role of
the physician to interpret or be encouraged by societal values.235

V.

CONCLUSION
Legal and ethical norms support the notion that medically qualified prisoners should be able to

obtain organ donations regardless of their incarceration status, how violent the crime, and their ability to
pay. However, whether organ transplants for prisoners actually get performed strongly depends on
society’s commitments to a prisoner’s health and health care.236 A prisoner receiving an organ transplant
creates a perceived injustice; murderers, thieves, and rapists could secure a life-saving organ from a lawabiding citizen who is of the same medical need. The scarce donor pool and current donation policies
offer no solution to the paradox. However, consider the alternatives. Any policy where medical
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judgment is subordinate to non-medical factors such as societal worth could have damaging effects on
society beyond transplant decisions.
The debate and case law regarding prisoner organ transplants have only begun to develop. The
number of aging men and women confined in United States prisons will continue to grow. And the
connection between the increase of aging inmates and the subsequent increase in the need to treat
chronically ill prisoners with organ transplants will continue to become more prevalent absent significant
policy changes.
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